Laurent Vilanova présente un article à la conférence internationale Strategic Management Society (SMS) à San Francisco

Laurent Vilanova, Professeur de Finance à l’Université Lumière Lyon 2, a présenté l’un de ses articles théoriques intitulé « Optimism, Market Entry, and Competitive Deterrence » lors de la 45ᵉ conférence annuelle de la Strategic Management Society (SMS), qui s’est tenue à San Francisco.

Résumé :
I study a sequential entry game in a winner-take-all market where success depends on relative project quality, and some entrepreneurs (but not all) overestimate their project’s quality. For a potential early entrant, overestimating one’s project quality (individual optimism) can have both negative and positive consequences: it increases the incentive to enter, which can lead to excess entry but may also limit under-entry in markets where realistic entrepreneurs stay out; it can also help deter potential rivals. The net gain of individual optimism for entrepreneurs with low-quality projects (i) depends on market potential (the market’s capacity to provide positive payoffs for one or two entrepreneurial firms) and group-level optimism (the proportion of optimists vs. realists among entrepreneurs), (ii) is generally positive in low-potential markets where optimism helps deter potentially stronger rivals, and (iii) is maximized at moderate levels of group-level optimism in low-potential markets but declines with group-level optimism in high-potential markets. Finally, I show that overoptimistic beliefs tend to persist over time, particularly in low-potential markets, and that optimism, compared to realism, can facilitate learning.